작품 소개
This book seeks to bring about a greater understanding of Korean peace process by exploring past and present policy toward North Korea since the 1990s. The Korean peace process was initiated in order to resolve the inter-Korean conflict and denuclearize North Korea. In 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung announced a Sunshine Policy towards North Korea and an Inter-Korean summit was held in 2000. In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. A second inter-Korean summit was held in 2007. In 2017 South Korean President Moon Jae-in returned to the Sunshine Policy. A summit between Moon and Kim took place in the South Korean zone of the Joint Security Area, and they signed the Panmunjom Declaration pledging to work towards a permanent peace to the Korean peninsula and the complete denuclearization of Korea.
본문중에서
Chapter 1. Introduction
The Korean Peace Process in the Context of Conflicts in the Global and Regional Orders
Sang-Hwan Lee (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)
Scott Gates (University of Oslo and Peace Research Institute Oslo(PRIO))
COVID-19 may one day be recorded in history as the origin of the Neo-Cold War between the US and China. A new global order has emerged in the wake of the virus’s spread, characterized by de-globalization and digitalization of the global community. COVID-19 has accelerated the de-globalization trends in domestic and global societies and deviations from shared values have resulted in a Neo-Cold War Order. The Neo-Cold War is a product of the US-China hegemonic struggles in the post-cold war period in association with China’s rapid economic and military growth. Their value clashes further have riven the relationship.
The shift from a world of globalized and open societies to an international order based on de-globalization and closed societies concerns us. A valuable lesson COVID-19 taught us is that communitarian cooperation and open societies guarantee an optimistic future in the global order.
The rise of China affects not only US hegemony but constitutes a more immediate regional power transition with Japan in northeast Asia and plays a critical role in shaping the peace process in the Korean peninsula. Indeed, to understand the Korean peace process, we must consider these three different layers of politics, in the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and the global order. All three layers will be examined through the lens of
power transition theory. The rise of China profoundly shapes all of these relations.
The Global Order: From US Preponderance to Sino-US Competition [China as a dissatisfied challenger]
For almost two decades, the most significant feature of the global balance of power has been the steady rise of Chinese economic and military strength, as well as the spread of its soft power. Indeed, the most important, and persistent, issue relating to the rise of China is whether China is willing and able to take over as the lone superpower (Lee & Kim 2016).
Given China’s capabilities and intentions, China cannot initiate the power transition for the time being. The US still maintains supremacy in terms of military capabilities, usage of IT technologies, and physical quality of life. China will take another couple of decades at the very least to develop its capabilities to reach parity with the US. China also faces fundamental difficulties in eliciting a power transition away from the US, because the US is a different type of hegemonic power than any previous rising state has faced. Representing Western civilization, the current international order led by the US is easy to integrate into, but difficult to deconstruct. In this light, China’s power transition, and taking over as global hegemon seems hardly possible for the time being (Lee & Kim 2016).
There have been many differing analyses concerning a potential power transition from the US to China. Chinese analysts have argued that current US power is on the decline; that the US-led unipolar system is unambiguously creeping towards an end and making room for a multipolar system; and that the current international order may be under a radical shift. Some have highlighted the US’ neglect of its soft power and its subsequent loss of legitimacy as a leader in the international arena (Lam, 2010; Lampton, 2010; and Saunders, 2010). Reviewing changes in Chinese perceptions of US power and the future international order, American China experts have suggested that the major source of the current Sino-American confrontation is the serious Chinese miscalculation, stemming from the combination of its diplomatic overconfidence and its internal insecurity (Nye, 2010; Glaser and Morris, 2009).
Notably, given the growing diversity within the Chinese academia and society, some Chinese scholars have cautiously and rationally warned against drawing premature conclusions. Generally positioned in the higher echelons of academia and representing the majority opinion, these scholars have argued that no conspicuous rationale suggests that the US is falling in an irrecoverable setback and have also ruled out the possibility of a fundamental change to the global balance of power. Given the current international environment, they insist, no state has been able to constitute a comprehensive challenge against the US, and the current international power structure of “one superpower and many great powers” will continue for the foreseeable future. Admitting that there is no decline in US power and no fundamental changes in the global structure, these scholars have drawn a conclusion that China should avoid becoming embroiled in the central maelstrom of global politics and prioritize, instead, managing its own domestic affairs (Lam 2010).
Critical to US and China relations and the prospects of a power transition is the degree of satisfaction with the current global system exhibited by China. System satisfaction can be understood in terms of bilateral coordination, cooperation, and recognition between the US and China. We draw on a prominent study that employs content analysis of articles appearing in Chosun Ilbo (a prominent South Korean newspaper) from the period 2003 to 2013 (H. Kim, 2014). A total of 348 articles regarding US-China relations were classified in terms of conflict (210 cases), cooperation (98 cases) and other (40 cases). Note that there have been twice as many conflict cases as cooperation cases for the period.
Conflict over economic issues has primarily related to exchange rates, energy, and trade. Exchange rate problems concern currency valuation, where the US has been more offensive and China more defensive. They have often reproached each other but avoided catastrophe. In contrast, as the US trade deficit resulting from Chinese import penetration has expanded, economic relations have been more conflictual, especially during the Trump administration. Notably, in spite of these tensions, the two powers have successfully managed crises through strategic dialogue.
Security relations between the US and China relate to North Korea, military
training, and territorial disputes. Their views on how to deal with the North Korean nuclear tests and missile launches differ substantially. In addition, several conflicts concerning military training of US allies and territorial disputes in East Asia have flared, but the conflicts have been managed.
The two countries, nevertheless, have narrowed the differences between their views. According to Pew Research, there have been ups and downs in conflictive and cooperative events; and sometimes they occur together. In sum, China cannot yet be categorized as a dissatisfied great power willing to challenge the US globally as a hegemon in the terms described by the power transition theory (Lee & Kim 2016).
리뷰
상품평
아직 상품평이 없습니다.
팝업 메시지가 여기에 표시됩니다.